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The current age is marked by the expansion and dominance of large corporate entities. Enterprises like financial institutions, technology 
companies, and retail firms have extended their presence to all parts of the 
world and have firmly positioned themselves as integral parts of the social, 
political, and economic make-up of modern civilization. Consequently, 
information regarding these corporations holds immense credence 
in assessing the various facets of contemporary society. Whether it be 
measuring a nation’s GDP, or (as demonstrated by the recent Facebook-
Cambridge Analytica data scandal) monitoring the degree of personal 
privacy, information related to these firms is of great value to all members 
of society. 
In particular, the subject of CEO compensation at these companies 
garners a great deal of interest. The chief executive officer (CEO) is the most 
senior employer at an organization and is tasked with leading the company’s 
managerial team. The primary goal of the CEO is to maximize shareholder 
value, which is the value of the company owned by its shareholders. 
The extensive levels of attention directed towards CEO compensation 
stem largely from the increasing degree of income inequality in society. 
Currently, “America’s top 10 percent averages more than nine times as 
much income as the bottom 90 percent.”1 Also, “the gap between worker 
and CEO pay was eight times larger in 2016 than in 1980.”2 These damning 
facts provoke several questions about the nature of CEO compensation; 
particularly, which factors determine compensation levels and, by virtue, 
whether or not such compensations are justified. Other issues pertaining 
to the CEO demographic include the unequal representation of women in 
managerial positions. The purpose of this paper is, beyond all else, not to 
    1    “Income Inequality,” Inequality.org, last modified April 21, 2018, https://
inequality.org/facts/income-inequality/..
    2    Ibid.
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provide theoretically-sound answer to these questions; instead, this paper 
intends to merely explore different factors related to the CEO demographic 
using various statistical techniques. Specifically, this paper will explore (1) 
various factors affecting CEO compensation, (2) a comparison between 
CEO and non-CEO income, (3) issues associated with gender equality, and 
(4) general performance of companies in the S&P 500, which constitutes a 
collection of the 500 most valuable companies in the US.
The dataset (see Appendix G) used in this paper was acquired from 
Equilar—a software company that provides corporate data. Since 2011, 
Equilar has published an annual CEO Pay Study that details information 
on CEOs at various companies listed on the S&P 500. This dataset used 
in this paper includes data on 346 companies for both 2015 and 2016. The 
analyses in this paper were executed using a combination of the Excel and 
STATA software packages.The following variables from the study are used:
• Amount: Total financial compensation received by a CEO for 
the given year.
• Change: The percentage change in compensation between 
2015 and 2016.
• Total stock return (from this point forward, tsr): The percentage 
change in stock price for the company. A popular indicator of a 
company’s and its CEO’s annual performance.
• State: The US state which the company is located in.
• Gender: The gender of the CEO.
• Industry: The industry sector that the company belongs to.
First, I test the distribution of the data since the majority of the 
statistical analyses that are performed are dependent upon the data 
being normally distributed. I plot the variables: amount, change, and tsr 
since these are the variables of interest. The histograms (see Appendix 
A) all demonstrate a bell-shaped curve with one-hump that is typical of a 
normally distributed set of data. Despite the presence of some outliers, the 
variables can appropriately be viewed as normally distributed. Additionally, 
I assume the data was randomly sampled. Indeed, the sample of 346 firms 
is not entirely random, as they are all obtained from the S&P 500; however, 
I can assume that the sample of 346 companies is randomly selected from 
the initial 500 particularly because of how diverse the companies are. To 
further support this assumption, I narrow the study to solely pertain to 
CEOs from S&P 500 (S&P) companies.
Income Inequality
A major motivation for this study is to understand the level of income 
inequality between CEOs and average workers. To test the assertion of 
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income inequality, I compare the median personal income in the USA with 
the median income of the data set. I use the median instead of the mean 
because incomes are traditionally cited using their median values. This is 
due to the median being a far less sensitive parameter than the mean and 
therefore less affected by outliers. The range of incomes in the dataset is: 
($1, $980,012,344); therefore; using the median is necessary. I perform 
this analysis using the Wilcoxon Sign Test, the calculation displayed below. 
This test compares and ranks the medians between two population groups. 
In 2016, the median personal income in the US was $31,099.3
H0: m = 31,099
H1: m > 31,099, where m = median CEO compensation
Consequently, Yi = xi – 31,099, where xi = each individual 
compensation.
W = (-3) + 60028 = 60025
Consequently: 
And the subsequent p-value = P ( Z ≥ 16.119) ≈ 0. Therefore, there is 
statistical evidence to reject the null hypothesis (H0) at every significance 
level. Essentially, the median S&P CEO income does exceed that of 
the national median. For interest’s sake, the median of the sample is: 
$11,471,061 which is approximately 368.86 times larger than the national 
median. Also, the 95 percent CI for the mean income is:
    
         , where x̄ = $12,769,269.00
which equals = ($11,890,886.77; $13,647,651.23); therefore, I can be 
95 percent confident that the average value of CEO income is within this 
range.
Regression
I now wish to test a possible predictor of CEO compensation within the S&P. 
If, according to theory, a CEO’s primary aim is to maximize shareholder 
value, then annual shareholder return should be a good indicator of CEO 
performance and thence changes in their annual compensation. Therefore, 
I perform the following regression:
    3    “Real Median Personal Income in the United States,” US Bureau of the Census, 
retrieved from Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, last modified September 13, 2017, 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MEPAINUSA672N.
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Change in compensation = f(tsr) + µ, where µ ~ N(0, σ2), I 
have already confirmed that the variables are random and 
distributed normally.
Appendix B shows the results. The regression line (Appendix C) is:
Change = 0.876224 + 0.2094612tsr
This regression is statistically reasonable because the confidence interval 
for β (0.0223323,0.3965901) does not include zero at the five-percent 
significance level. This implies that in 95 percent of cases, tsr has the 
above impact on changes in compensation. Also, Appendix D shows the 
various scatterplots of the residuals against tsr and change values. All 
plots show a random scatter with no discernable pattern about the line 
y = 0 with most points between y = ± 3; therefore, I can confirm that each 
data point varies with great similarity from the average effect of tsr, and 
that there is no autocorrelation with regards to the error terms. I can also 
ascertain that α and β are distributed normally in accordance with the 
nature of the linear regression model. The model explains that an increase 
in tsr of one percent results in an increase of 0.002095 percent in CEO 
compensation, all else equal. This result makes sense and is significant 
at the five-percent significance level but not at the one percent level since 
its p-value is 0.028. The model has a correlation coefficient of 0.0139; 
therefore, only 1.39 percent of the variation in change is explained by tsr 
—this is demonstrated by the regression line shown in Appendix C with the 
data points spread out widely apart from the regression line.  This is a low 
value which implies that other factors aside from shareholder value impact 
a CEO’s compensation.
Industry-Specific
Average S&P CEO income could be affected by the industry that the firm 
belongs to. The sample includes eight industries: basic materials, consumer 
goods, financial, healthcare, industrial goods, service, technology, and 
utilities. To test the relationship between industry and mean income, I 
utilize a one-factor ANOVA test, which compares the averages across 
the population groups. I can utilize this test by assuming that incomes 
across industries (xi) are distributed normally: xi ~ N(µi, σ
2) and that each 
xi is independent of others. For the dataset, it is reasonable to presume 
independence since there is no reason to believe that the income of one 
CEO should affect another.
H0: µBM = µF = µC = µH = µI = µS = µT = µU
H1: Not all µi’s equal
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From Appendix E, the F-stat (19.966) > Critical value (3.5) therefore I 
can reject the null hypothesis at the five percent significance level. The 
p-value is very small (0.00018); therefore, I can essentially reject the 
null hypothesis at all significance levels. Hence, mean incomes do vary 
across industries, implying that CEO compensations are affected by their 
respective industries.
State-Specific
I perform another one-factor ANOVA test to determine whether location 
across the US affects mean S&P CEO compensation. The previous 
assumptions still apply. Thirty-seven states are represented:
H0: µALABAMA = µARKANSAS = … = µWISCONSIN
H1: Not all µi’s equal
From Appendix F, the F-stat (11.77) > Critical value (1.73) therefore I can 
reject the null hypothesis at the five percent significance level. The p-value 
is incredibly small (8.92 x 10-12); therefore; I can effectively reject the null 
hypothesis at all significance levels. Hence, mean incomes do vary across 
states which implies that location does affect CEO compensation.
**Note: I perform two separate one-factor ANOVA tests as opposed 
to a single two-factor ANOVA test due to a lack of experience/confidence 
in executing a two-factor test correctly.  
Male vs. Female
Another contentious issue currently is the discrepancy in income levels 
between males and females, as well as the matter of females being 
underrepresented in senior managerial positions. Consequently, I test 
these claims.
Representation
To test if females are equally represented in managerial positions, I utilize 
a population proportion test, which tests if 50 percent of the companies 
in the dataset have female CEOs. I take p = 0.50, where p = proportion 
female CEOs to represent equal representation of genders.
H0: p = 0.50
H1: p < 0.50
          = 0.06069 →  
0.06069 ±1.96           = (0.03553;0.08585) 
Therefore, I can be 95 percent confident that p̂ is between 3.55 percent 
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and 8.585 percent; therefore, there is sufficient evidence to reject the 
null hypothesis at the five-percent significance level. In sum, women are 
underrepresented in CEO positions amongst S&P 500 companies.
Income
To test for the gender wage gap and investigate if men earn more, I utilize 
the following test statistic:
              , where Sp = 
n = number of male CEOs   
m= number of female CEOs
I use this test statistic because incomes for both genders can be assumed 
to be distributed normally. Also, it seems reasonable to presume that 
compensation levels between male and females CEOs varies equally. 
Additionally, m is not large which is important for this assumption.
x̄ (mean male income) = $12,648,009.79
ȳ (mean female income) = $14,488,643.29
sx
2 = 7.0320 x 1013 
sy
2= 5.6196 x 1013 
H0: µF = µM
H1: µM > µF
t0.05
344 = 1.649
T = - 0.981 < 1.649; therefore, there is insufficient evidence to 
reject the null hypothesis at the five-percent significance level.
P-value = P(t ≥ 0.981) = 0.1636 → It is only possible to reject the 
null hypothesis at the 17 percent significance level or higher. 
Thence, I conclude that there does not exist a gender pay 
gap amongst S&P CEOs; in fact, the sample shows females 
earning more than males, on average.
Performance
After concluding that I cannot statistically observe any significant 
discrepancy in incomes between male and female CEOs, I move to 
determining if there is any significant difference in a company’s performance 
(measured by tsr) between male- and female-led companies. Again, I can 
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use the following test statistic:
    ,  where Sp = 
n = number of companies with male CEOs; 
m= number of companies with female CEOs
H0: µF = µM
H1: µF ≠ µM
t0.025344 = 1.649
x̄ = 0.1599
ȳ = 0.2767
sx
2 = 0.02514
sy
2= 0.07883
│T│ = 3.09 > 1.9669 therefore, there is sufficient evidence to 
reject the null hypothesis at the five-percent significance level.
P-value = P (t ≥ 3.09) = 0.0022 → It is only possible to reject 
the null hypothesis at 0.22 percent significance level or higher. 
Thence, from the test, I can conclude that S&P companies 
performed differently depending on the gender of the CEO; 
namely, companies led by male CEOs tended to perform better.
Are Compensations Justified?
Lastly, I turn to a macroeconomic outlook and consider the overall 
performance of the companies in the dataset. In 2015 and 2016, the S&P 
500 stock index grew substantially. Given the large compensations that 
these CEOs typically received, it is worthwhile to test if their companies 
performed well in order to evaluate if these large compensations are 
justified.
H0: p = 0.5
H1: p ≠ 0.5    ,  where p̂ = proportion of companies with
     positive tsr values.
**Note: I use 0.50 due to the zero-sum game nature of the stock 
market (i.e. for every winner there exists a loser).
  = 0.75434
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0.75434 ± 1.96           = (0.70898;0.7997)
 
I can be 95 percent confident that 70.9 percent to 79.97 percent of companies 
in the S&P 500 had positive stock price growth, which ultimately aligns with 
market trends. Thus, large compensations appear to be justified.
Conclusion
I went through several procedures testing average S&P CEO compensation, 
essentially testing the basis for their incomes. The results were: CEOs 
are compensated far more than average workers; some industries and 
locations are associated with higher compensation packages; women are a 
minority in CEO positions but they are not underpaid; however, companies 
with male CEOs seem to have performed better than those with female 
CEOs. Additionally, I saw that companies performed well during these 
years, and technology firms seemed to have outperformed service firms 
by a small margin. It is important to recognize that these conclusions are 
appropriate for S&P 500 companies, not for all companies. Also, these 
conclusions are based on statistical analyses that are highly dependent 
on the sample of data used; therefore, these results are always open to 
statistical error and bias. Further studies in this area might include firms 
from outside the S&P 500 and may look at additional factors like CEO 
experience, age, education, and relation to CEO compensation packages. 
Lastly, any errors, statistical or otherwise, are my own.
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